Nonsense in NatGeo's “Year Million”

The National Geographic channel has a new TV series entitled “Year Million.” A recent episode in the series was entitled “Never Say Die,” and was about the prospects of human immortality. The episode was long on slick visuals, and short on intelligence. The episode presented the ideas that we will greatly extend human longevity by using nanobots and genetic engineering, and that later people will upload themselves into computers.

The episode presented a simplistic view of biological life, one that is purely mechanistic, epitomized by a person who said, "We are still biologically hindered by the squishy computer in our heads.” The assumptions seemed to be that biological life is merely some mechanical phenomenon that humans can completely master through technologies such as nanobots and genetic engineering. These assumptions are quite dubious because of all the profound mysteries involving biological life.

It is generally admitted that we do not understand the origin of life. It is generally admitted that we do not understand the mystery of protein-folding (why proteins conveniently form into three-dimensional shapes needed for our existence). It is generally admitted that we do not understand the mysteries of morphogenesis, how it is that a fertilized egg is able to progress to become a baby who then grows into a full-grown human. We also don't really understand the origin of species, as the theory of evolution by natural selection is merely a theory of accumulation rather than what we actually need to explain the mountainous degrees of coordination, structural fine-tuning, and functional coherence in our bodies: a theory of organization explaining the arrival of the fittest, not just the survival of the fittest. As discussed here, we also don't really understand where it is that the body plans of organisms are stored, because DNA is a minimal “bare bones” language unsuitable for describing three-dimensional body plan blueprints; so while DNA might be storing a list of chemical ingredients, it does not actually seem to have a specification of our body plans.

We therefore have every reason to suspect that biological life involves some mysterious forces or factors very far beyond our understanding. If that is the case, then the prospect for vastly increasing the human lifespan through injecting humans with tiny robots called nanobots and tinkering with DNA may be much less bright than many think.

But there is some reasonable hope that genetic engineering or nanobots might extend the human lifespan, so this part of the TV show wasn't nonsensical. The show did become nonsensical when it discussed the very dubious concept of mind uploading in a completely uncritical manner. Among the reasons why mind uploading is such a dubious concept is that we have no understanding of how a brain could even be storing memories that last for decades, given all the rapid molecular turnover and protein turnover that occurs in brains; and we have no idea of how brains can generate abstract ideas. Mind uploading cannot possibly work unless some reductionist model of consciousness and memory is correct; and there are very good reasons (discussed here and in this series of posts) for doubting that any such model is correct.

The show quoted neuroscientist Michael Graziano, who made this very dogmatic proclamation:

A lot has to be done before we can figure out whether we can take a pattern of connectivity from a brain and upload it or copy it. It's going to happen; I'm positive of that. Everything's moving in that direction.

Graziano's certainty on this matter is laughable. There is no basis for believing that minds can ever be uploaded. There is no progress at all in mind uploading. Instead of “everything's moving in that direction,” the situation is actually, “nothing's moving in that direction.” And why is Graziano saying he's sure it's going to happen, just after saying, “A lot has to be done before we can figure out whether we can take a pattern of connectivity from a brain and upload it or copy it”? Those two thoughts contradict each other.

The show then quotes string physicist Michio Kaku, who nowadays seems to have his head popping up on every science or futurism documentary put on television. Kaku states, "Believe it or not, we can actually upload memories, and record memories in mice.” This statement is false. The actual claims that have been made by certain mice researchers (researchers in optogenetics) is that memories in mice can be blocked or activated. Such claims are not well founded, and are based on a few doubtful studies using a dubious methodology. The studies typically report weak levels of statistical significance. See here for a discussion of the flaws in some of these studies.

Making claims about mind uploading, the show's narrator says this:

Once we shed our physical bodies, we will exist only as a computer copy of our brains. It's hard to imagine exactly, but basically you'd be digital information stored on a server.

The TV show assures us that mind uploading is the key to eternal life. The narrator says this:

But when we start talking about immortality, that's a whole other can of worms. If we really are serious about getting to forever-land, we'll have to replace our carbon based human bodies and upload ourselves to a super-computer.

The show then tells us this existence will be like some afterlife heaven. We are told:

We're talking about everlasting life in a digital paradise....All of society will live digitally in a virtual world called the metaverse that's a thousand times more intense than the one you live in now.

There are quite a few reasons why such a thing is very unlikely to happen. First, the brain does not store digital information, so the mind is very likely not something that can be uploaded into a computer. Second, there is not the slightest evidence that the brain uses any type of readable code to store information. DNA uses the genetic code, something we can understand and read. But we have zero knowledge of anything like a brain code that we can use to read information from the brain. Nor can we plausibly imagine how such a code could have originated, as it would have to be something almost infinitely harder to explain than the genetic code (the origin of which is very hard to explain).

Third, you could never electronically capture the exact state of a particular person's brain, even if you tried to use microscopic nanobots to do such a thing. Imagine trying to exactly map every synapse and neuron in a brain with nanobots. Each of the brain-mapping nanobots would have to somehow be aware of its own exact position in the brain, so it can record the exact position of each neuron and brain connection it encounters. So if a nanobot comes to a neuron that is 1.334526 centimeters from the left edge of the skull, and 2.734538 centimeters from the right edge of the skull, and 5.292343 centimeters from the back of the skull, then those exact coordinates must be recorded. But how can a microscopic nanobot do that? You can't supply a microscopic nanobot with a little GPS system allowing it to tell its position. So it would seem that nanobots are completely unsuitable for any such job as mapping the exact physical microscopic structure of an organ with billions of cells and synapses packed together in a small space.

Then there's the duplication problem. Imagine if there was a machine that could scan your brain, and then upload your mind to a computer. Even if that process was done perfectly, the computer would not have your mind. It would instead have a copy of your mind. You may realize this just by considering that if this uploading process didn't kill you, and the computer with your “mind upload” existed at the same time as you, there wouldn't be two you's. There would be one you, and a copy of you living in the computer. If you then died after this upload, it would not at all be true that you had survived death by the fact that a copy of your mind was in the computer.

None of these difficulties are discussed on the “Year Million” TV show. The show presents mind uploading as a sure thing, ignoring all the reasons for thinking that it can't ever happen. Not only did the TV show present mind uploading as something that will likely happen; the TV show assured us that mind uploading is the key to true immortality – on the grounds that once you are living in a computer server, you are guaranteed to live forever.

This is nonsensical, because the programs running on computer servers sometimes crash and stop working; the programs running on computer servers are sometimes deliberately halted; and the computer servers themselves sometimes crash, lose power, or are turned off. If you were living in a computer server, there is no reason why you should be confident that you will be around for more than a century or two. 

 After the father and daughter mind-uploaded

The next episode of the “Year Million” TV series continued to be largely about mind uploading, speaking as if this extremely doubtful idea was on solid ground. There was also a pitch for the idea that we are already living inside computers. The “Year Million” TV series is on track to be the silliest documentary series ever put on about the human future.

Given our very low state of knowledge about the most basic riddles of biology, memory and consciousness, fantasies of mind uploading are rather like the fantasies of some boy who knows almost nothing about the contents of the sun, but who fantasizes that he will one day reorganize the sun into a shape and color more pleasing to him.

He Wants to Upload His Way to Multiple-Body Immortality

The runaway fantasies of mind-uploading enthusiasts are documented in a recent BBC article on the topic, an article that also helps to reveal the logic shortfalls of these fervent apostles of what has been called “the rapture of the nerds.”

We are first introduced to a Russian who says modestly, “Within the next 30 years I am going to make sure that we can all live forever,” and who says that he is “100% confident it will happen.” Is he talking about some immortality potion or pill? No, he is talking about the idea that you will be able to copy the essence of your brain to a computer or robot, and that this will give you immortality.

There are quite a few reasons why such a thing won't happen. First, the brain does not store digital information, so the mind is very likely not something that can be uploaded into a computer. Second, there is not the slightest evidence that the brain uses any type of readable code to store information. DNA uses the genetic code, something we can understand and read. But we have zero knowledge of anything like a brain code that we can use to read information from the brain. Nor can we plausibly imagine how such a code could have originated, as it would have to be something almost infinitely harder to explain than the genetic code (the origin of which is very hard to explain).

Third, you could never capture the exact state of a particular person's brain even if you tried to use microscopic nanobots to do such a thing. There have been some reasonable projections about what nanobots can do. For example, we can imagine nanobots that clear artery blockages that are starting to form. You just inject into the arteries a nanobot that is able to detect such a blockage, and then have the nanobot do something to reduce the blockage, perhaps by just releasing a tiny droplet of some chemical. That wouldn't be too hard for a little nanobot only about the size of a cell. But imagine trying to map a brain with nanobots. Each of the brain-mapping nanobots would have to somehow be aware of its own exact position in the brain, so it can record the exact position of each neuron and brain connection it encounters. So if a nanobot comes to a neuron that is 1.334526 centimeters from the left edge of the skull, and 2.734538 centimeters from the right edge of the skull, and 5.292343 centimeters from the back of the skull, then those exact coordinates must be recorded. But how can a microscopic nanobot do that? You can't supply a microscopic nanobot with a little GPS system allowing it to tell its position. So it would seem that nanobots are completely unsuitable for any such job as mapping the exact physical microscopic structure of an organ with billions of cells packed together in a small space.

Then there's the duplication problem. Imagine if there was a machine that could scan your brain, and then upload your mind to a robot. Even if that process was done perfectly, the robot would not have your mind. It would instead have a copy of your mind. You may realize this just by considering that if this uploading process didn't kill you, and the robot existed at the same time as you, there wouldn't be two you's. There would be one you, and a copy of you living in the robot. If you then died after this upload, it would not at all be true that you had survived death by the fact that this robot existed.

This has been pointed out many times to mind-uploading theorists, and it seems to have gone in one ear and out the other without ever making contact with their brains. For example, the previously quoted Russian makes this statement: "For the next few centuries I envision having multiple bodies, one somewhere in space, another hologram-like, my consciousness just moving from one to another." Apparently he thinks that he will be able to move from one body to another by just making sure that no more than one of his electronic incarnations is active at the same time.

Imagine it: you upload your body to robot X and robot Y. Your body then dies. Can you now “switch your mind from robot X to robot Y” just by turning off robot X and turning on robot Y, or “switch your mind from robot Y to robot X” just by turning off robot Y and turning on robot X? Of course not. In reality, both robot X and robot Y will at best be copies of you. Your life is not extended beyond the death of your body because either robot X exists or robot Y exists. And it certainly won't be a case of you “switching bodies” because one machine is turned off and another is turned on.

The greedy fantasies of the mind uploading theorists are amazing. If you want to hope for a technological extension of your life, why not just hopefully imagine that you will be able to take some kind of youth serum that will extend your life – or that you will be able to have your brain transplanted into a robot body that might last centuries? No, our mind upload theorists must imagine for themselves something even more extravagant – the ability to switch their minds between different bodies. It's kind of like a person who is not satisfied with just believing that he will go to heaven, but also wants to believe that once he gets to heaven he will rule as the king of heaven.

Let me tell a little science fiction story. Once there was a planet on which most of a continent was covered by a densely packed jungle. The trees of this jungle had long thin branches and vines that could connect with many other trees. A particular tree might have branches and vines that stretched out for hundreds of meters, connecting with hundreds of other trees. But there was something very remarkable about this jungle. When most arrangements of these trees and branches and vines existed, the huge jungle was just an ordinary jungle, no more conscious than a stone. But when there got to be a sufficiently great density of these trees and branches and vines, the jungle became a self-conscious mind, and was capable of judgment, analysis, insight, imagination and self-conscious experience.

The story isn't very believable, is it? Why should a jungle become self-conscious merely because there was some particular arrangement of trees and branches and vines? But such a story is just like the story that our neurologists ask us to believe. We are told that we have consciousness merely because of a particular arrangement of densely packed nerve cells and dendrites connecting different cells – an arrangement quite like that of the jungle just described, except that instead of trees it is nerve cells, and instead of branches it is dendrites, and instead of vines it is axons. 

Jungle thickets and neural thickets

That is a tale that makes no sense, and the only reason it is accepted is that we don't have some other account of consciousness that does make sense. But one day we will learn of such an account, a completely convincing story of how our consciousness arose. When we finally learn such a story, I suspect it will make perfect sense. At that time I suspect we will look back on our current ideas of the origin of consciousness (and related notions such as uploading human minds into computers) as being laughable fairy tales.

Road Maps to Future Immortality?

Maria Kkonovalenko recently created some cool visuals outlining three “road maps to immortality.” The first one is here, and depicts a path to immortality by genetic engineering. The second visual depicts a path to immortality by regenerative medicine. The third one is here, depicting a path to digital immortality.

The steps Maria has outlined are fascinating to ponder, but I think there are definite moral and practical difficulties we must ponder before getting too excited. First, let's look at Maria's path to immortality through regenerative medicine.

One thing Maria imagines is pigs serving as “bioreactors for growing human organs.” I have a moral issue with this proposal, which is quite similar to the moral issue I have regarding breeding pigs for slaughter. The problem is that pigs are highly intelligent and sociable animals. A scientist once made a crude video game with a large joystick cursor that an animal could manipulate with its snout. The scientist tested whether dogs or pigs could learn how to use the game. Even after many efforts, dogs were unable to learn the game, but pigs learned how to use it very quickly. So there is reason to believe that pigs are even more intelligent than dogs. Would it be moral for us to use pigs to grow some material that we would use in our body, for super-long lives? Possibly not.

Another thing Maria imagines is head transplants, and growing a new body in the lab. We can imagine the scenario: once you get to be 60, you start growing a new body in a big glass unit you keep in your basement. Then when you get to be 80, you arrange to have your head transplanted to the new body.

But there would be two big problems with this approach. The first is that while you would have a new body, you would still have the same old, aging brain. The result might look something like this:

There would also be the moral difficulty involved in growing the second body. Since a body requires a brain to function, how could you grow a replacement body without that body having its own mind and personality? If the body did have such a mind and personality, it would presumably be murder for you to have surgeons decapitate that body and replace its head with your head. Perhaps the replacement body could be set up so that it didn't have any mind. But the idea of having a mindless replacement body growing for 20 years in a lab or your basement is creepy, like the story of Frankenstein.

None of these messy biological and moral difficulties are associated with Maria's third road map to immortality, her vision of digital immortality. But I don't think the scenario she imagines is very plausible. She basically imagines that we will learn more and more about how consciousness works, by scanning and analyzing brain tissue. She imagines us concentrating on animals first, first figuring out exactly how the brain of a smaller animal works, then figuring out how the brain of a larger animal works, and then finally figuring out exactly how the human brain stores memories and produces thoughts. Then once we understand that, according to this vision, we can create computers or robots that duplicate this functionality, and upload our minds into such electronic units.

There are several problems with such a scenario. The main one is that the production of human consciousness by the brain is one of the great mysteries of nature, and there is little hope that we will be able to solve it through brain scanning. No matter how closely we examine a neuron or brain tissue with a scanning device, it seems unlikely we will ever be able to say, “Aha, there is a thought being produced,” or “I see it now; there is a memory being stored.” So brain-scanning offers little hope that we will be able to understand the brain and consciousness enough to perfectly reproduce it electronically. There is also the whole duplication problem discussed here.

We should not necessarily be depressed if digital immortality is not possible. The situation can be expressed through the flow chart shown below. The question is: is the origin of spiritual human consciousness from mere physical matter a kind of “miracle of consciousness” that can never be understood in terms of mere physics, chemistry, and biology – perhaps something that can only be understood through some more transcendent principles? If the answer to that question is “no,” then there is perhaps some hope that some of us may be able to achieve some kind of digital immortality by uploading our minds into machines. But if the answer to this question is “yes,” then there is a distinct possibility that such transcendent principles may open the door to some kind of spiritual immortality. I don't find this latter possibility to be any less hopeful than the first. 

The Downside of Gradual Brain Replacement

Futurists have advanced three scenarios for immortality. The first possibility is protoplasmic immortality, which is basically what we imagine when we think of the possibility of a youth pill. The second possibility is uploading your mind into a computer or robot. This would presumably involve the destruction of a person's brain while every neuron and connection in it was being scanned, in order for the person's consciousness to be recreated electronically. But there is a big problem with this possibility. If you destroy someone's brain to determine its exact state, and then reproduce that state electronically, it would seem that this is really just a making a copy of someone's consciousness, rather than really preserving it and continuing it. It would seem that the regular human would actually die when such a scanning was done, and that the new electronic consciousness would really be a newly created person rather than the continuation of a previous life.

But there is a third possibility that might seem to offer more hope. This is the possibility of gradual brain replacement. Under this scenario a person might gradually have his regular human neurons (the cells in his brain) replaced with electronic units, perhaps some kind of artificial neuron. This process would avoid the sudden and abrupt transition that might come from an “all at once” mind uploading.

For example, every week during twenty consecutive weeks, a person might have one twentieth of his neurons replaced with electronic units. Since the electronic units might take up less space, there might at the end of this process be enough room in the skull to allow the person to eventually have an entirely electronic brain with a number of artificial neurons twice as great (or perhaps even ten times as great) as the number of neurons in the average human brain.

After the process was finished, the person might be much smarter. Another advantage is that he might then have a brain capable of lasting for centuries. The next steps might be replacing the other vital organs with electronic substitutes. The person might then gradually transition from a mortal body of flesh and blood to a potentially immortal body of silicon, plastic, and steel.

Those who imagine such a scenario suppose that as a person's brain was gradually replaced, the new electronic parts would be seamlessly integrated with the old parts of the brain, the parts made of flesh and blood. But getting the two parts to mesh together seamlessly might be enormously difficult.

There is a horrible possibility that few have considered. It might be that when you had some of your brain replaced with electronic parts, those parts would tend not to link with the old flesh and blood parts of your brain, but would instead tend to link together to form a second consciousness or personality in your brain. Gradual brain replacement might be a ticket to a split personality.

In such a case we can imagine a person with basically two brains in his skull – the old brain consisting of flesh and blood neurons, and the new brain consisting of electronic components. The two brains might vie for control over the muscles and limbs below the neck.

So with gradual brain replacement there would therefore be a chance for a new type of Jekyll and Hyde scenario. I can imagine future legal defenses like this: I didn't kill my wife; the electronic part of my brain did it.

Another terrifying possibility is that as you underwent gradual brain replacement, rather than feeling that your brain was getting smarter, you might feel that your brain was getting weaker, and that you were losing control over your body, as some foreign electronic consciousness in your skull took control of your body. This is exactly what could happen if more and more of your natural neurons were replaced with artificial neurons, and those neurons failed to seamlessly integrate with the rest of your neurons, forming instead a second consciousness or personality inside your skull. It would be like you were Personality X, and the new electronic neurons were forming Personality Y. As Personality Y got stronger and stronger, and smarter and smarter, your personality (Personality X) might get weaker and weaker and stupider and stupider.

An analogy is that when immigrants from very different lands are introduced into our society, we hope they will assimilate gracefully, becoming like the existing inhabitants and working well with them. But sometimes immigrants fail to do that, and instead form their own society with its own agenda (for example, La Cosa Nostra). Something like that could happen in your brain if you replaced part of your neurons with artificial units.

Someone might argue that things could not get too out of hand, because in a scenario I have imagined you could always alert the doctors that something had gone wrong. But maybe by then you wouldn't be in the driver's seat of your body – maybe your dwindling consciousness would be like someone stuffed in the back trunk (with the electronic part of your brain in the driver's seat).

Perhaps the best way to illustrate such a danger is through a science fiction story. Below is a tale of a man who underwent gradual brain replacement, and lived to regret it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------
Gradual Brain Replacement: A Science Fiction Story
--------------------------------------------------------------------
So here I am, unable to see anything, unable to hear anything, unable to smell anything, unable to move a muscle, and unable to feel anything. I have only a week left to live – I mean the real me, not that electronic thing that took over my brain – so I might as well review (in what's left of my mind) the whole horrible story.

In the year 2051 when people started doing that new thing called mind uploading, I knew it wasn't for me. Mind uploading was that deal where they destructively scan your brain, and supposedly transfer all your memories to the computer inside a robot body. Sure there were cases where a person had his mind uploaded into a robot body, and then the robot came to life and starting saying, “I'm the same John Smith who used to have a flesh and blood body, so bury the ruined protoplasmic body of the old John Smith.” But how can you be sure that in those cases John Smith didn't really die, just to be replaced by a new electronic person, who got some of John's memories? You can't. So I wanted to try something different: gradual brain replacement. I figured that was safer, that it would preserve the real me.

Gradual brain replacement works like this: bit by bit, over a period of a few months, they gradually replace all the neurons in your brain with electronic artificial neurons. The 3D TV commercials promise that this preserves the real you, and that nothing can go wrong, because if you notice something wrong at some point in the gradual process, you can just tell the doctors to stop doing anything more.

When I went into the doctor's office, he told me I had made a smart decision, and that everything would go fine.

“Gradual brain replacement is the way to go,” said Dr. Preston. “You'll be able to think a lot faster once the operations are done, and you'll be able to remember a lot more. Plus there's the fact that it's basically the first step to immortality. Once you don't have to worry about your brain wearing out, you can later get your other organs replaced, and plan on living for hundreds of years.”

So I told Dr. Preston to get started with the first operation. When I woke up after the operation, my mind seemed pretty much like it was before. Dr. Preston told me it would be a while before I noticed anything different. Then I left the hospital.

When I was walking into the parking lot, I noticed something very strange. The fingers on my right hand seemed to be moving all by themselves, even though I wasn't willing them to move.

The next day I opened the door to the refrigerator, and started reaching for an apple with my left hand. Then all of a sudden my right hand started reaching for a juice bottle. But I hadn't willed for my hand to reach for that juice bottle. It had somehow happened all by itself.

Then later while talking to my wife, I started saying words that came out of nowhere. I hadn't willed my lips to say the words. It was as if my lips were speaking all by themselves.

I sat down to think about what was happening. There was only one explanation. The new electronic neurons they had put in my head were somehow acting as an independent mind. The new electronic neurons hadn't integrated with the old biological neurons in my brain. Instead of there being a single enhanced mind inside my brain, there were now two minds inside my brain: my old mind, and a new electronic mind. And the two of them were in conflict. They weren't on the same page. I had no idea what the new electronic mind was thinking.

I tried to call Dr. Preston to tell him about the problem. But every time I picked up the phone and tried to dial with my left hand, my right hand grabbed the phone and threw it to the floor. So I simply decided that I would wait for my upcoming appointment with Dr. Preston at the hospital, and I would tell him the whole story at that time.

Over the next few days I found myself hearing my lips saying more and more things I hadn't told my lips to say. I also felt my hands doing more and more things I hadn't willed them to do. These were the actions of my new electronic neurons that had formed their own independent mind. I had no idea what that mind was thinking.

Finally the day of my appointment arrived. I waited in Dr. Preston's office. He came in and asked me: “So do you want us to proceed with the next operation, the next phase in the gradual brain replacement?”

I willed myself with all my might to say: “No.” But the words that came out of my lips were: “Yes.” The new electronic mind inside my brain had got the upper hand, and was becoming more and more dominant.

There was still one thing I could do. I still had control of my left hand. So I made my fingers into a “Thumbs down” gesture, trying to say “No” in the only way I could.

But Dr. Preston didn't notice. He took me over to a room in the hospital where they started to prepare me for the next operation. I tried to scream as hard as I could, but my lips were no longer in my control. They put me under anesthesia. The operation was going to replace even more of my biological neurons with new electronic neurons.

When I woke up, I found I no longer had any control over my lips or my eyes or my hands or my feet. It wasn't like I was paralyzed. I moved around and talked. But it wasn't me controlling the movements and controlling what my lips said. It was the new electronic mind in my brain. That mind was now completely in charge of all of my speech and movements. It was like I had been shoved to the back seat of my body, and the new electronic mind was in the driver's seat. All I could do was enjoy the ride.

Dr. Preston thought the operation had gone flawlessly. He saw me moving around okay, and speaking intelligently. But it wasn't me speaking and moving – it was that damned new electronic mind.

For two weeks I lived a life of passive observation. I could still see my body moving around and talking and meeting people. I just had not one bit of control over what my body did. It was just like passively watching television.

Then my body arrived back at the hospital, for one more operation in the gradual brain replacement operation. I was put under anesthesia. When I awoke, I was horrified. I could no longer see anything. I could no longer feel anything. I could no longer hear anything. I could no longer smell anything.

All I could do was make a deduction. The latest operation must have given exclusive use of my senses to the new electronic mind in my brain, which must now be using up a larger fraction of my brain. That's why I can no longer see or hear or smell or feel.

I also find my memory fading. I can no longer remember where I was born, or what land I live in, or what planet I live on, or who my parents or children are. The new electronic mind must be using up more and more of my memory.

Almost the only thing I can remember is that the final operation in the gradual brain replacement process will take place next week. By then my skull will contain an entirely electronic brain. The only problem is, it won't be my mind. It will be the mind of some weird new electronic thing. The real me will die as soon as my last biological neuron is replaced.

Why did I ever sign up for that gradual brain replacement?

The Problem with Mind Uploading

Let us consider an interesting thought experiment, which may perhaps seem fanciful and irrelevant, but which technology may make very relevant in several decades.

Let us imagine a machine called Scan and Duplicate, that works on an atomic level. The machine scans the atoms in a person's body, from the tip of your toes to the top of your head. As it is scanning, the machine produces an exact duplicate of what it is scanning. The only problem is that in order to do this exact reading of the state of all atoms in your body, the machine must destroy each part of your body that it scans.

So as the machine scans your body from your toes to the top of your head, each layer of your body is destroyed: first your feet, then your shins, then your knees, then your thighs, then your thorax, and finally your head. But as each part of your body is destroyed, a duplicate body is being assembled next to yours.

Finally at the end of this process, your body is a charred, blackened mess, like a chicken that was left in the oven at 500 degrees for three hours. A blanket is placed over this burnt body, and the body is wheeled to the incinerator. However, the newly created body awakens and it claims to be you.

“Well, that all went very well,” says the freshly assembled person, and that person goes on living the rest of your life, remembering everything in your memory.

Now my question is: is this newly constructed person you? Or did you die when this operation is done, and is the surviving person merely a copy of you?

When I posed this question to my family, I got different answers from different family members. My answer is: the newly assembled person is not you, but is merely a copy of you. If this operation were to be done, you would die during the operation. There would be a newly created person that would act just like you, but it would merely be a copy of you; it would not be you.

This thought experiment is relevant because of a technological possibility that has been widely discussed: the possibility of uploading a human mind into a computer or robot.

Some technological enthusiasts imagine that in several decades we will be able to create computers or robots that have all of the capabilities of the human brain, with a great deal of additional memory and processing power. Such enthusiasts imagine that we might be able to scan a person's brain and transfer a person's consciousness to a robot body or a computer. Such a technique has been promoted as a way of achieving immortality through technology.

There are two types of mind uploading that can be imagined: destructive uploading (in which the original brain of the person is destroyed) and non-destructive uploading (in which the original brain and body of the person is preserved).

Let us imagine non-destructive uploading to a robot body that resembles your body. Your mind is copied to a robot body, and now two people are walking around with your memories and personality. 

In this case, it is fairly obvious that the newly created mind (with all your same memories) would not really be you. Because in this case, your original body and mind would be preserved. So the real you would be the original you, not the new entity that looked like you and had your personality.

What is a little less obvious, but still something very likely, is that even in the case of destructive uploading the newly created entity would not be you. If your body is destroyed at the same time that a new biological or robot entity is created with all your memories and personality, it would really mean that you had died, even though a newly created person would continue to act like you and remember what you had remembered. If a doctor performed such an operation, he would actually be guilty of murder.

You might argue that it would not be murder for the doctor to perform such an operation, because even though your original body had been destroyed, there would be a new life, so the net number of living persons would be unchanged. But we don't exonerate someone for killing just because he created a new life at the same time he ended another life. “I impregnated my wife at the time of the murder” is not a successful defense in court against a charge of murder.

Because of considerations such as these, you should take no comfort in stories about the possibility of mind uploading. Mind uploading wouldn't really extend your lifespan; at best it would mean additional years for someone or something that was a copy of you. If you want to entertain the prospect of living far beyond the human lifespan, you can consider possibilities such as biological life extension or replacing your body below the neck with a robot body or the possibility that near death experiences suggest a chance of spiritual immortality. I don't believe mind uploading is going to save anyone from the Grim Reaper.

For an excellent blog post considering other problems with the idea of mind uploading, check the blog post here.