In the last quarter of the twentieth century, scientists began to consider very many reasons why the existence of life in a universe such as ours required for the laws and fundamental constants of the universe to be very precisely fine-tuned. What looked like very precise fine-tuning was found again and again, in places such as the expansion rate of the universe at its earliest instant, and the precise balance between the absolute value of the charge of every proton and the exactly equal absolute value of the charge on every electron (despite the rest mass of protons and electrons differing by a factor of 1836). Below are some quotes by scientists who discuss such fine-tuning:
- "We conclude that a change of more than 0.5 % in the strength of the strong interaction or more than 4 % change in the strength of the Coulomb force would destroy either nearly all C [carbon] or all O [oxygen] in every star. This implies that irrespective of stellar evolution the contribution of each star to the abundance of C or O in the ISM would be negligible. Therefore, for the above cases the creation of carbon-based life in our universe would be strongly disfavoured." -- Oberhummer, Csot, and Schlattl, "Stellar Production Rates of Carbon and Its Abundance in the Universe."
- "The Standard Model [of physics] is regarded as a highly 'unnatural' theory. Aside from having a large number of different particles and forces, many of which seem surplus to requirement, it is also very precariously balanced. If you change any of the 20+ numbers that have to be put into the theory even a little, you rapidly find yourself living in a universe without atoms. This spooky fine-tuning worries many physicists, leaving the universe looking as though it has been set up in just the right way for life to exist." -- Harry Cliff, particle physicist, in a Scientific American article.
- "If the parameters defining the physics of our universe departed from their present values, the observed rich structure and complexity would not be supported....Thirty-one such dimensionless parameters were identified that specify our universe. Fine-tuning refers to the observation that if any of these numbers took a slightly different value, the qualitative features of our universe would change dramatically. Our large, long-lived universe with a hierarchy of complexity from the sub-atomic to the galactic is the result of particular values of these parameters." -- Jeffrey M. Shainline, physicist (link).
- "The overall result is that, because multiverse hypotheses do not predict the fine-tuning for this universe any better than a single universe hypothesis, the multiverse hypotheses fail as explanations for cosmic fine-tuning. Conversely, the fine-tuning data does not support the multiverse hypotheses." -- physicist V. Palonen, "Bayesian considerations on the multiverse explanation of cosmic fine-tuning."
- "A mere 1 percent offset between the charge of the electron and that of the proton would lead to a catastrophic repulsion....My entire body would dissolve in a massive explosion...The very Earth itself, the planet as a whole, would crack open and fly apart in an annihilating explosion...This is what would happen were the electron's charge to exceed the proton's by 1 percent. The opposite case, in which the proton's charge exceeded the electron's, would lead to the identical situation...How precise must the balance be?...Relatively small things like atoms, people and the like would fly apart if the charges differed by as little as one part in 100 billion. Larger structures like the Earth and the Sun require for their existence a yet more perfect balance of one part in a billion billion." -- Astronomy professor emeritus George Greenstein, "The Symbiotic Universe: Life and Mind in the Cosmos," pages 63-64.
- "The evolution of the cosmos is determined by initial conditions (such as the initial rate of expansion and the initial mass of matter), as well as by fifteen or so numbers called physical constants (such as the speed of the light and the mass of the electron). We have by now measured these physical constants with extremely high precision, but we have failed to come up with any theory explaining why they have their particular values. One of the most surprising discoveries of modern cosmology is the realization that the initial conditions and physical constants of the universe had to be adjusted with exquisite precision if they are to allow the emergence of conscious observers. This realization is referred to as the 'anthropic principle'...Change the initial conditions and physical constants ever so slightly, and the universe would be empty and sterile; we would not be around to discuss it. The precision of this fine-tuning is nothing short of stunning. The initial rate of expansion of the universe, to take just one example, had to have been tweaked to a precision comparable to that of an archer trying to land an arrow in a 1-square-centimeter target located on the fringes of the universe, 15 billion light years away!" -- Trinh Xuan Thuan, Professor of Astronomy, University of Virginia, “Chaos and Harmony” p. 235.
Materialists have always been very annoyed by all this talk by scientists about how very fine-tuned our universe is. So it is no surprise that they attempted a response. The main response by materialists has been the clumsiest response that they could have made. This response was the speculation of a multiverse -- that there exists some infinity or near infinity of universes. Materialists started saying things such as "There could be some infinity of universes, each with different characteristics, and with all those universes, it is not surprising that one of them had characteristics compatible with living creatures such as us."
There are quite a few reasons why imagining a multiverse is the clumsiest way possible for a materialist to respond to cosmic fine-tuning:
1. A multiverse explanation is the worst imaginable violation of Occam's Razor
Occam's Razor is the long-honored principle that “entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity” when explaining things, or that we should prefer to explain things as simply as possible. A multiverse is the greatest imaginable violation of the principle of Occam's Razor. A multiverse is what you might propose if you were following the exact opposite principle, a very stupid principle of “entities should be multiplied to the greatest number possible” when trying to explain something (a demented principle we might call “Anti-Occam's Razor”).
2. A theory of a multiverse is unverifiable metaphysics that can never be confirmed by observations
Although often made within scientific discussions, the theory of a multiverse is a metaphysical theory which can never be confirmed through scientific observations (despite insinuations to the contrary by multiverse proponents). Contrary to what some have claimed, looking for evidence of some unusual “flow” in some part of our universe could never confirm a theory of a multiverse, nor could any observations of early universe conditions. Such observations would at best imply that there was something that we did not understand about our universe, or that perhaps there was some “sister universe'' next to our universe (although such an area should more properly just be considered an unobserved part of our universe). We could never make any observations from our universe that would confirm that there are a vast number of other universes with different characteristics.
3. A multiverse explanation “proves” the wrong thing – that some universe would be habitable (without increasing the chance that our universe would be habitable)
Another problem with the multiverse reasoning is that it “proves” the wrong thing. An effective theory of multiple universes would be one that showed a likelihood that our universe would have the characteristics necessary for life purely by chance. The multiverse theory does not claim to show that. Instead it claims to show that “some universe” would by chance have the properties necessary for life. Now you may say: “some universe” and “our universe” – so what, no big difference. But there actually is a gigantic difference between the two. Confusing “some universe” and “our universe” (thinking as if they were the same) is an error in logic, an example of careless, sloppy thinking.
I can best illustrate the point by mentioning the case of a lottery. The Powerball lottery is a lottery with an incredibly low chance of winning, and a gigantic jackpot. Each year they sell enough Powerball lottery tickets to make sure that at least one person will win, but the chance of any lottery ticket buyer winning is less than 1 in a million. So consider these odds (which might be pondered by a couple that purchased a ticket):
Chance of some ticket winning: 100%
Chance of our ticket winning: less than 1 in 1,000,000
So as we can see, there is a gigantic world of difference in this case between “some ticket” and “our ticket.” There is an equally gigantic world of difference between “some universe” and “our universe” when we consider universes. Showing that some universe (under a multiverse theory) would be successful does not show that our universe would be successful.
In fact, the multiverse scenario does absolutely nothing to make it more likely that our particular universe would by chance have the characteristics necessary for intelligent life. If the chance of our universe being successful were 1 in a billion trillion quadrillion before we assume the multiverse, that chance is exactly the same even after we assume a multiverse.
When mathematicians talk about probability, they speak of a trial as being something that might produce a favorable outcome (examples are a roll of a dice, a dealing of 5 cards from a deck, or a purchase of a lottery ticket). But it is a general rule of probability that increasing the number of trials does not increase the chance of success of any one trial.
From a purely explanatory standpoint, a multiverse is therefore the ultimate absurdity: a theory that introduces infinite baggage that serves no explanatory purpose, because it does not increase the odds of our universe being successful. The thing that a multiverse “explains” (some universe being successful) is not what we need to have an explanation for (the fact that our universe was successful despite such enormous odds).
I can illustrate the futility of a multiverse explanation with the following lines of dialog:
John: It required so many improbable coincidences for our universe to have intelligent life – what could be the explanation?
James: A lucky “1 in a zillion” accident – pure blind luck.
John: That's too farfetched, because it would have required something like a 1 in a 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 shot.
James: Well, there could be a multiverse. Maybe there's an infinite number of universes. Some of them might have got lucky.
John: An interesting thought. But still, why was our particular universe so lucky?
James: A lucky “1 in a zillion” accident – pure blind luck.
Here James has introduced an extravagant theory that accomplishes nothing. Before introducing his multiverse theory, his explanation for the universe's habitability was a lucky 1 in a “zillion” accident, and he is still stuck with that explanation even after introducing the multiverse scenario. The multiverse theory accomplishes nothing for him.
4. There is no verified case of anything ever being successfully explained by a type of explanation like a multiverse explanation, nor can we plausibly imagine any such case ever being verified
The typical process of rational explanation can be described as follows: (a) examine some thing that needs to be explained; (b) select some type of explanation that has been proven successful for other cases; (c) apply such an explanation to explain the thing that needs to be explained.
For example, if we see something strange in the sky that is unexplained, we can try to explain it by selecting “weather phenomenon” as our type of explanation, because we know that numerous previous items have been successfully explained by postulating weather as the explanation (for example, the morning dew on the grass of your lawn). More adventurously, we can explain the strange thing in the sky as an alien spacecraft. While we do not have a verified case of anything being successfully explained by exactly postulating an extraterrestrial spacecraft, we do have numerous observations that we know have been successfully explained by advancing this type of explanation – numerous strange lights in the sky have been explained successfully by mentioning some type of spacecraft (earthly spacecraft).
But in the case of a multiverse, it is an entirely different story. We have not one single verified case of anything that has ever been successfully explained by advancing any theory like the theory of a multiverse. A multiverse explanation therefore has a singularly low credibility. One can compare it to a totally new type of machine that has never been proven to work before.
For the multiverse enthusiast, this is an insolvable dilemma. We can have no confidence in multiverse explanations until we can have a verified case of this type of explanation explaining something, but it is impossible to reasonably imagine anything ever getting a verified explanation through this type of explanation (whether it be our universe's fitness for life, or anything else).
5. A multiverse theory can “explain” any claim, no matter how absurd; as it can “explain” anything, it explains nothing
A multiverse theory is in fact a kind of inane all-purpose explanation engine. It can be used to “explain” almost any absurdity or any theory no matter how improbable.
Basically whatever crazy theory you wish to believe in, you can justify with multiverse reasoning. Do you want to believe that underground is a vast kingdom of leprechauns, cute little people like those in Irish mythology? Do you want to believe that these little leprechauns are all riding along underground on little unicorns? You can get there with a multiverse. You simply reason that no matter how improbable such a thing may be, we would expect it to have occurred at least once if there are an infinite number of universes.
The graphic below visualizes my point that a multiverse can be used to “explain” any absurdity. A multiverse can be basically used to "explain" anything. That which explains anything explains nothing.
The Stupid "You Shouldn't Be Surprised" Response
Another lame response of materialists to cosmic fine-tuning is to make claims that "we should not be surprised" to find ourselves in a universe like the one we live in, on the grounds that any observer would find himself in a universe as fine-tuned as ours. The fallacy of this line of reasoning is explained in my post "Firing Squads and Habitable Universes: The Fallacy of Appealing to an Observer Selection Effect" which you can read here, and my post "Our Luxury Results Debunk the Multiverse As an Explanation" which you can read here. It is not at all true that any observer would find himself in a universe as fine-tuned as ours. A universe could have much less fine-tuning, and still allow the brief existence of observers without long lives and stable civilizations. The amount of fine-tuning in our universe is very much more than the minimum needed for observers. Our universe has a kind of "luxury" level of fine-tuning that enables things much more than just fleeting observers: things we take for granted such as stable stars allowing stable metal-rich civilizations in which people can have luxuries such as long lives, language use and jet plane trips. The idea is schematically depicted below.
The Latest Very Clumsy Attempt by Materialists to Respond to Cosmic Fine-Tuning
The latest example of very lame reasoning in response to cosmic fine-tuning is an article by Daniele Sorini on the website The Conversation. It is an article entitled "Many physicists argue the universe is fine-tuned for life – our findings question this idea." We have another example of what is enormously common these days -- scientists making a claim about their research that is not justified by anything in their research papers.
The article resorts to straw-man reasoning. Straw-man reasoning is when you attack some distorted version of an argument or assertion that is rarely or never used by people making that argument or assertion. Sorini attacks a straw-man version of cosmic fine-tuning. He states, "We may not be inhabiting the most likely of possible universes," as if anyone mentioning cosmic fine-tuning ever made such a claim. No one claiming cosmic fine-tuning ever claimed that we lived in the most likely of possible universes. Instead, people referring to cosmic fine-tuning claimed the opposite -- that habitable universes are incredibly rare in the set of all possible universes.
Sorini then discusses how he and his colleagues did some calculations suggesting that if there were more dark energy there might have been more stars and more life. Sorini appeals to calculations in his paper filled with speculative equations. Using extremely speculative reasoning relying on many questionable complex assumptions, Sorini claims that if there were a little more dark energy, there might have been more stars formed, possibly leading to more life. Sorini tries to insinuate that this does something to damage the idea of cosmic fine-tuning, on the grounds that some other possible universe might have produced more life than ours.
This is a bad example of the fallacy known as straw man reasoning. No one discussing cosmic fine-tuning ever claimed that our universe has special characteristics that cause it to be some universe producing the maximum amount of life that a universe could produce. It has always been very obvious that our universe is not such a universe. Our universe is almost entirely empty space, and the distance between stars is very enormous. We can obviously imagine a universe that would produce much more life per cubic light-year than our universe. We can imagine a universe with many more stars and planets than our universe has, in which the distance between stars is much smaller. Or we can imagine a universe with a uniform temperature, consisting of a giant flat infinite plane entirely inhabited by living beings. We don't need Sorini's dubious rigmarole gobbledygook calculations to figure out that we don't live in a "most life per volume of space" universe. Such a thing has always been obvious.
Were you to show that some other possible universe could have produced or supported the existence of more life, that does nothing to discredit claims that our universe is very fine-tuned to allow life, in a way that would be impossible or all-but-impossible for chance to have achieved. Similarly, imagine there is a eight-year-old boy living in a ten-story apartment building equipped with electricity, heating and plumbing. He might know nothing about how apartment buildings arise, but he would be correct in reasoning that his apartment building could not have appeared by any accident of nature, and that it must have required purposeful design. His ten-year-old brother would do nothing to undermine such an argument if he said that the apartment building could have supported some more living creatures if it had eleven floors rather than ten. The eight-year-old did not claim that he lived in a building that maximized something; he merely said that he lived in a building with convenient fine-tuned characteristics that chance could not have produced. The ten-year-old brother's irrelevant statement is comparable to the irrelevant reasoning Sorini is using.
Just as such an eight-year-old boy would not be claiming that his apartment building is some structure that maximizes the amount of life that any structure could support, people mentioning cosmic-fine tuning have not claimed that our universe is something that maximizes the amount of life that it could hold in its volume (it obviously is not). And just as pointing out that the apartment building could have an additional floor with inhabitants does nothing to discredit the claim that the apartment building was too fine-tuned to be an accident of nature, pointing out or calculating that our universe could have had more life in its volume of space does nothing to discredit the claim that our universe is too fined-tuned to be an accident of nature.
It is ironic that Sorini is even bringing up the topic of dark energy while trying to discredit the idea of cosmic fine-tuning. In the very topic of dark energy seems to be one of the most powerful cases of cosmic fine-tuning. Dark energy is equivalent to what cosmologists call the cosmological constant, and here is what two scientists said about that topic:
"The cosmological constant must be tuned to 120 decimal places and there are also many mysterious ‘coincidences’ involving the physical constants that appear to be necessary for life, or any form of information processing, to exist....Fred Hoyle first pointed out, the beryllium would decay before interacting with another alpha particle were it not for the existence of a remarkably finely-tuned resonance in this interaction. Heinz Oberhummer has studied this resonance in detail and showed how the amount of oxygen and carbon produced in red giant stars varies with the strength and range of the nucleon interactions. His work indicates that these must be tuned to at least 0.5% if one is to produce both these elements to the extent required for life." -- Physicists B.J. Carr and M.J. Rees, "Fine-Tuning in Living Systems."
When they state that "the cosmological constant must be tuned to 120 decimal places," what Carr and Rees refer to is luck as great as the luck you would have if you correctly guessed on the first try the twelve separate ten-digit telephone numbers of twelve strangers. It is extremely clumsy for Sorini to be mainly referring us to dark energy in trying to discredit cosmic fine-tuning, because a deep dive into that topic will take you to what seems like one of the strongest examples of cosmic fine-tuning, one of the strongest reasons for thinking our universe is no accident. For more information on this topic, read my widely-read post " 'Vacuum Catastrophe' Should Be Called the Vacuum Miracle."
The statement of Carr and Rees about the cosmological constant (equivalent to dark energy) is reiterated by another scientist who says this:
"What is particularly striking is how sensitive the possibility of life in our universe is to a small change in these constants. For example, if the constant that controls the way the electromagnetic field behaves in a vacuum is changed by four percent, then fusion in stars could not produce carbon....Change the cosmological constant in the 123rd decimal place and suddenly it's impossible to have a habitable galaxy." -- Marcus Du Sautoy, Charles Simonyi Professor for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University, "The Great Unknown," page 221.
