Behold today's materialists, many of which act like they were soldiers in a War on Meaning. What we can call the War on Meaning is a long-standing agenda of materialists to describe human life in a way that makes it sound as meaningless as possible. Materialists started out by pushing the idea that the human race is a mere accident of nature, contrary to all of the facts of biology which suggest in the strongest way that we are here on purpose. Materialists never had more than the scantiest crumbs of reasoning to try to back up such a claim that the human species is an accident of nature, but they used "give us an inch, and we'll take a mile" tactics to try to make their specious specks look like something substantial.
Materialists have long engaged in free-will denialism, which has been part of this War on Meaning. Trying to portray human life as having no moral meaning, materialists attempted to persuade us that all of our actions are unavoidable on the grounds that every decision is just chemistry or electricity going on in the brain, and that we are controlled by the "falling dominoes" of molecular interactions. The best way to debunk this nonsense is to study the brain and its many severe physical shortfalls very carefully, which leads the sufficiently diligent scholar and philosopher of mind to the conclusion that brains cannot explain human decisions, human beliefs or human memory. Once we adequately study the brain and human mental phenomena in all its diversity and human best mental performances that are impossible to explain by neural means, the malignant foolishness of free-will denialism melts away like the Wicked Witch of the West melting away near the end of The Wizard of Oz.
Later on materialists tried to drag us down the craziest of rabbit holes, pushing the nutty idea of an infinity of parallel universes in which all possible events occur, and in which human life has no meaning. There was never the slightest iota of evidence for believing in such a claim. The claim was based on the silliest reasoning. It was argued that there is in quantum physics a puzzle of "wave function collapse," and that one way to get around the puzzle is to imagine that every possible outcome is actualized. This was the stupidest reasoning.
The very concept of a "wave function collapse" is a social construct of physicists, not an actual physical reality. A wave function is part of a mathematical calculation method that physicists find useful in making certain predictions. According to most interpretations of quantum mechanics, there is no actual event in nature corresponding to a "wave function collapse." As the source here says, "Of the several 'interpretations' of quantum mechanics, more than half deny the collapse of the wave function." Another source puts it this way:
"In one view, a wave function is a piece of math, an equation. It’s not a physical thing. So, it can’t collapse in any physical sense. The collapse is metaphorical. This is one interpretation of quantum mechanics. It’s the interpretation taught in most university classes, the Copenhagen Interpretation."
So the idea that we should believe in some infinity of parallel universes because we are puzzled by a wave function collapse was always the silliest nonsense, rather like believing in an infinite anti-universe because we are puzzled by the concept of negative infinity. But many materialists love the idea of an infinity of parallel universes, because it gives them a pretext for a description of reality in which all meaning is destroyed. Of course, some multiverse in which all possible outcomes occur is a multiverse devoid of any meaning. A person's life can have no meaning if he lives in some multiverse in which everything he might possibly do occurs.
Then there is the simulated universe theory originated by Nick Bostrom. It is the idea that extraterrestrial civilizations have computers that are simulating our reality, and that you are just some bits in an extraterrestrial computer. The reasoning Bostrom gave for the idea was fallacious. It was based on the idea that there is a nonzero chance that extraterrestrial computers can produce a stream of experiences like human experiences. This crucial premise of the theory was false. Computers can no more create a stream of human experiences than your television set can cause a tiger to leap out of its screen and bite you. Arguments that we are mere bits in some extraterrestrial computer program are part of the War on Meaning. If you were merely part of some simulation of human life running on a computer on another planet, then your life presumably would have no meaning, and you could not even be sure that the people you see really exist.
Recently we had on a popular podcast an example of the featherweight reasoning of simulated universe theorists. It comes in the 56:12 mark of the interview here with AI expert Roman Yampolskiy. The podcast host talks about how there is some impressive Google program producing video output from text prompts. The host says this is the beginning of being able to create a simulation that simulates "everything we see here," apparently referring to his studio and his current podcast. Yampolskiy then unwisely says, "That's why I think that we are in one, that's exactly the reason," and by "we are in one" he means a simulated universe in which our experience is produced by computers.
This is some very bad reasoning. The impressive Google program the podcast host is referring to is something that merely produces pixels on a computer screen. Neither that program nor any other program has ever produced the slightest iota of human experience. It's the same thing for video consoles such as PlayStation and X-Box. They produce mere pixel outputs on a screen, and never produce the slightest speck of human experience. A human may interact with a computer or a video console, and have his experience affected by such devices. But no such devices have ever produced a single second or a single millisecond of human experience.
Therefore all arguments based on improving computer proficiency are completely worthless in supporting the idea that computers on other planets can produce our experience. What is going on in such arguments is equivocation sophistry. Ambiguity in the word "simulation" is being leveraged. First the simulated universe believer uses the word "simulation" to refer to something that is only output on a computer screen. Then (without announcing that he is changing how he is using the word "simulation") the believer starts talking about universe simulations, using "simulation" in an entirely different sense, to mean something that has never been observed to any degree whatsoever: the production of human-like experience from computer activity.
This is the same kind of equivocation sophistry that goes on if someone says, "Taylor Swift is a star; a star is a giant self-luminous ball of hot gas; so Taylor Swift is a giant self-luminous ball of hot gas." In that fallacious reasoning, the speaker switches the definition of "star," using one definition at the beginning, and an entirely different definition at the end. Similar tricks are used by the simulated universe believer. First he refers to a "simulation" that is a mere output of pixels on a screen. Then, without announcing he is switching the definition of "simulation," he says something about a "simulated universe" in which the idea is a flow of human experience like the experience humans have. Progress in producing outputs on computer screens gives not the slightest warrant for thinking that outputs of human experience could be produced by a computer. No computer has ever produced one speck of human experience.
Materialists are constantly engaging in equivocation sophistry like this. Their biggest example involves equivocation on the word "evolution." First the materialist will tell you "evolution is fact," referring to a fact of mere gene pool change over time. Then the materialist will say that this proves the doctrine of common descent, which is a definition of "evolution" entirely different (and a billion times more presumptuous) than the mere fact of gene pool change over time.
Yampolskiy is reasoning very poorly when he states this at the 57:02 mark, using the phrase "we are in one" to mean that humans are merely part of an extraterrestrial computer simulation of our existence:
Yampolskiy: "That's why I think we are in one, that's exactly the reason. AI is getting to the level of creating human agents, human level agents. And virtual reality is getting to the level of being indistinguishable from ours."
There is progress in computer programming and data processing that allows some computer programs to perform highly, debatably at "human level." But that provides not the slightest warrant for establishing the possibility or likelihood that human experience is produced by extraterrestrial computers. Getting a computer to produce a second, minute or day of human experience is an entirely different task from getting computers to produce some visual output on a screen that looks like human experience. Similarly, progress in virtual reality provides not the slightest warrant for thinking that a computer could produce a single minute of human experience (not to be confused with screen output simulating human experience). And the fact that AI systems can provide high-performing results (such as well-answering a typed question) provides not the slightest warrant for thinking that computers will ever be able to produce any speck of actual human experience.
A person as old as me has seen over his lifetime the greatest progress in screen representations of tigers. The first tigers I saw on TV were blurry black-and-white affairs, no bigger on the TV screen than a dinner plate. Now my wide-screen TV can produce a stunningly sharp image of a tiger, almost as big as a real tiger. But it would be the worst type of reasoning for me to reason like this:
"Gee, the tigers on TV sure are getting better as the years pass. The first tigers I saw were black-and-white, small and blurry. Now my TV tigers are so big and realistic-looking, looking just like real tigers. So it seems that soon a tiger will leap out of my TV screen, and that might be dangerous. I better get a gun to protect myself."
The fact that there has been progress in TV screens producing images of tigers provides not the slightest warrant for thinking that a TV could ever produce a living tiger that could leap out of a TV screen. And progress in simulating human experiences on television screens and computer screens provides not the slightest warrant for thinking that computers could ever produce a single second of actual human experience. There is only one thing capable of producing actual human experience: a real live human being.