For
several decades scientists have discovered more and more examples
suggesting our universe is seemingly tailor-made for life. A list of
many examples is discussed here. One dramatic example is the fact
that even though each proton in our universe has a mass 1836 times
greater than the mass of each electron, the electric charge of each
proton matches the electric charge of each electron exactly, to
twenty decimal places (the only difference being that one is
positive, the other negative). Were it not for this amazing
coincidence, our very planet would not hold together. But scientists
have no explanation for this coincidence which seems to require luck
with a probability of 1 in 100,000,000,000,000,000,000. As wikipedia
states, “The fact that the electric
charges of electrons
and protons seem to
cancel each other exactly to extreme precision is essential for the
existence of the macroscopic world as we know it, but this important
property of elementary particles is not explained in the Standard
Model of particle physics.”
Wishing
to cleanse their minds of any suspicions that our universe may not be
the purely accidental thing they imagine it to be, quite a few
materialists have adopted the theory of a multiverse. This is the
idea that there are a vast collection of universes, each very
different from the other. The reasoning is that if there were to be,
say, an infinite number of universes, each with different laws and properties, then we would expect that at
least one of them would have the properties necessary for intelligent
life, no matter how improbable it may be that such properties would
exist.
But
there are many problems with trying to use a multiverse to explain
cosmic fitness, or to explain anything at all. Let me list some of
them.
1.
A multiverse explanation is the worst imaginable violation of Occam's
Razor
The
first reason is that a multiverse violates to the most extreme degree
imaginable the long-standing principle of Occam's Razor, which has
been evoked by many a scientist over the centuries. Occam's Razor is
the principle that “entities should not be multiplied beyond
necessity” when explaining things, or that we should prefer to
explain things as simply as possible. A multiverse is the greatest
imaginable violation of the principle of Occam's Razor. A multiverse
is what you might propose if you were following the exact opposite
principle, a principle of “entities should be multiplied to the
greatest number possible” when trying to explain something (a
demented principle we might call “Anti-Occam's Razor”).
2.
A theory of a multiverse is unverifiable metaphysics that can never
be confirmed by observations
Although
often made within scientific discussions, the theory of a multiverse
is a metaphysical theory which can never be confirmed through
scientific observations (despite insinuations to the contrary by
multiverse proponents). Contrary to what some have claimed, looking
for evidence of some unusual “flow” in some part of our universe
could never confirm a theory of a multiverse, nor could any
observations of early universe conditions. Such observations would at
best imply that there was something that we did not understand about
our universe, or that perhaps there was some “sister universe''
next to our universe (although such an area should more properly just
be considered an unobserved part of our universe). We could never
make any observations from our universe that would confirm that there
are a vast number of other universes with different characteristics.
3.
A theory of a multiverse makes one believe in the exact opposite of
what our observations tell us --- that the laws and properties of
nature are the same everywhere
An
additional problem with the multiverse is that it leads one to
believe in something that is 100% contrary to what our observations
tell us. All observations made by physicists and astronomers support
the idea that the universe is incredibly uniform. By comparing
observations made by pointing telescopes in opposite directions of
the sky, astronomers can compare one section of the universe with
other sections on the opposite side of the observable universe. When
they do this, they find a picture of incredible uniformity. The
cosmic background radiation, for example, is uniform to within 1 part
in 100,000. The laws of nature seem to be the same everywhere. The
universe looks the same in all different directions. We have no good
evidence that the laws of nature and the universe's fundamental
constants have varied across the observable universe during the past
ten billion years. If they had, the universe would not look as it
does to astronomers.
So
nature is screaming at us: uniformity, uniformity, uniformity. But
the multiverse theory paints the exact opposite picture, a picture in
which there is nothing like uniformity (with each universe having
different characteristics). To believe such a theory, we must ignore
the message that nature is shouting at us, and believe in some other
imagined reality that is the exact opposite of what we observe. In a
very real sense, therefore, the theory of a multiverse is
counter-observational. Believing in an infinite variety of universes
each with very different properties is rather like believing that the
sun cycles through an infinite variety of different shapes – an
interesting idea, and perhaps possible, but one that is completely at
odds with what our observations tell us.
4.
A multiverse explanation “proves” the wrong thing – that some
universe would be habitable (without increasing the chance that our
universe would be habitable)
Another
problem with the multiverse reasoning is that it “proves” the
wrong thing. An effective theory of multiple universes would be one
that showed a likelihood that our universe would have the
characteristics necessary for life purely by chance. The multiverse
theory does not claim to show that. Instead it claims to show that
“some universe” would by chance have the properties necessary for
life. Now you may say: “some universe” and “our universe”
– so what, no big difference. But there actually is a gigantic
difference between the two. Confusing “some universe” and
“our universe” (thinking as if they were the same) is an error
in logic, an example of careless, sloppy thinking.
I
can best illustrate the point by mentioning the case of a lottery.
The Powerball lottery is a lottery with an incredibly low chance of
winning, and a gigantic jackpot. Each year they sell enough Powerball
lottery tickets to make sure that at least one person will win, but
the chance of any lottery ticket buyer winning is less than 1 in a
million. So consider these odds (which might be pondered by a couple
that purchased a ticket):
Chance of some ticket winning: 100%
Chance of our ticket winning: less than 1 in 1,000,000
So
as we can see, there is a gigantic world of difference in this case
between “some ticket” and “our ticket.” There is an equally
gigantic world of difference between “some universe” and “our
universe” when we consider universes. Showing that some universe
(under a multiverse theory) would be successful does not show that
our universe would be successful.
In
fact, the multiverse scenario does absolutely nothing to make it more
likely that our particular universe would by chance have the
characteristics necessary for intelligent life. If the chance of our
universe being successful were 1 in a billion trillion quadrillion
before we assume the multiverse, that chance is exactly the same even
after we assume a multiverse.
When
mathematicians talk about probability, they speak of a trial as being
something that might produce a favorable outcome (examples are a roll
of a dice, a dealing of 5 cards from a deck, or a purchase of a
lottery ticket). But it is a general rule of probability that
increasing the number of trials does not increase the chance of
success of any one trial.
From
a purely explanatory standpoint, a multiverse is therefore the
ultimate absurdity: a theory that introduces infinite baggage that
serves no explanatory purpose, because it does not increase the odds
of our universe being successful. The thing that a multiverse
“explains” (some universe being successful) is not what we
need to have an explanation for (the fact that our universe
was successful despite such enormous odds).
I
can illustrate the futility of a multiverse explanation with the
following lines of dialog:
John:
It required so many improbable coincidences for our universe to have
intelligent life – what could be the explanation?
James:
A lucky “1 in a zillion” accident – pure blind luck.
John:
That's too farfetched, because it would have required something like
a 1 in a 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 shot.
James:
Well, there could be a multiverse. Maybe there's an infinite number
of universes. Some of them might have got lucky.
John:
An interesting thought. But still, why was our particular
universe so lucky?
James:
A lucky “1 in a zillion” accident – pure blind luck.
Here
James has introduced an extravagant theory that accomplishes nothing.
Before introducing his multiverse theory, his explanation for the
universe's habitability was a lucky 1 in a “zillion” accident,
and he is still stuck with that explanation even after introducing
the multiverse scenario. The multiverse theory accomplishes nothing
for him.
5.
There is no verified case of anything ever being successfully
explained by a type of explanation like a multiverse explanation,
nor can we plausibly imagine any such case ever being verified
The
typical process of rational explanation can be described as follows: (a)
examine some thing that needs to be explained; (b) select some type
of explanation that has been proven successful for other cases; (c)
apply such an explanation to explain the thing that needs to be
explained.
For
example, if we see something strange in the sky that is unexplained,
we can try to explain it by selecting “weather phenomenon” as our
type of explanation, because we know that numerous previous items
have been successfully explained by postulating weather as the
explanation (for example, the morning dew on the grass of your lawn).
More adventurously, we can explain the strange thing in the sky as
an alien spacecraft. While we do not have a verified case of anything
being successfully explained by exactly postulating an
extraterrestrial spacecraft, we do have numerous observations that we
know have been successfully explained by advancing this type
of explanation – numerous strange lights in the sky have been
explained successfully by mentioning some type of spacecraft (earthly
spacecraft).
But
in the case of a multiverse, it is an entirely different story. We
have not one single verified case of anything that has ever been
successfully explained by advancing any theory like the theory of a
multiverse. A multiverse explanation therefore has a singularly low
credibility. One can compare it to a totally new type of machine that
has never been proven to work before.
For
the multiverse enthusiast, this is an insolvable dilemma. We can have
no confidence in multiverse explanations until we can have a verified
case of this type of explanation explaining something, but it
is impossible to reasonably imagine anything ever getting a verified
explanation through this type of explanation (whether it be our
universe's fitness for life, or anything else).
6.
A multiverse theory can “explain” any claim, no matter how
absurd; as it can “explain” anything, it explains nothing
A
multiverse theory is in fact a kind of inane all-purpose explanation
engine. It can be used to “explain” almost any absurdity or any
theory no matter how improbable.
Let's
randomly imagine an absurd theory which I may call the alien
deception theory. The theory is that evolution is false, and that all
of the fossils we have found suggesting evolution were planted on our
planet by aliens trying to fool us into believing that evolution
occurred. A multiverse theory “proves” this alien deception
theory to the exact same degree that it “proves” that our
universe's favorable characteristics are due to an accident. Exactly
the same reasoning may be given for both: even though it may seem
very improbable that such a thing would occur, we would expect it to
occur some times given a vast number of universes.
I
could go on and on with similar examples. Basically whatever crazy
theory you wish to believe in, you can justify with multiverse
reasoning. Do you want to believe that underground is a vast kingdom
of leprechauns, cute little people like those in Irish mythology? Do
you want to believe that these little leprechauns are all riding
along underground on little unicorns? You can get there with a
multiverse. You simply reason that no matter how improbable such a
thing may be, we would expect it to have occurred at least once if
there are an infinite number of universes.
Similarly,
whenever your eyes seem to tell you of some fact with great
certainty, you can use multiverse reasoning to support the idea that
what you are seeing is not really happening. If you are unlucky
enough to walk up to your house and see it burning on fire, you can
convince yourself that this is a hallucination. If you then think a
normal person like yourself would never have such a hallucination,
you can use multiverse reasoning to squash that objection. You simply
reason that no matter how improbable it may be that a normal person
would have such a hallucination, we would expect such a thing to
occur many times if there are a vast collection of universes.
The
graphic below visualizes my point that a multiverse can be used to
“explain” any absurdity. A multiverse can be basically used to
explain anything. That which explains anything explains nothing.
Postscript: See this paper by physicist V. Palonen. He makes the same point I made that the relevant consideration is the likelihood of this universe being habitable, not "some universe." Palonen writes:
It
follows that because multiverse hypotheses do not predict fine-tuning for
this particular universe any better than a single universe
hypothesis, multiverse
hypotheses are not adequate explanations for fine-tuning. Conversely,
our data
on cosmic fine-tuning does not lend support to the multiverse hypotheses.
For physics in general, irrespective of whether there really is a
multiverse or not, the common-sense result of the above discussion
is that we
should
prefer those theories which best predict (for this or any
universe) the phenomena we observe in our universe.
Brilliant. Thank God for this article.
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