The principle of
methodological naturalism is a proposed principle that scientists
should always exclude any supernatural explanation for anything,
and consider only natural explanations. It is claimed by some that
this is a “rule of science.” Evoking this principle is very
convenient for those who wish to rule out “in one fell swoop” all
evidence for any paranormal belief or supernatural belief. The
person who evokes the principle of methodological naturalism
basically attempts to evoke some supposed “rule of conduct” which
prohibits any consideration of the paranormal or supernatural by a
scientist.
Below are several reasons
why such a principle is very dubious and should not be evoked.
Reason #1: Since we do
not know the boundaries of nature, we have no business excluding
certain possibilities on the grounds that they are outside the
boundaries of nature.
Quite a few of the main
things that we might today call supernatural are things that might
one day be regarded as natural once we expand our knowledge of
nature. Consider an idea such as the soul. We might now consider
that supernatural, but once we expand our knowledge of nature we
might discover some account according to which the soul is natural.
We could say the some thing about apparitions, or alleged human
supernatural powers. An expanded understanding of nature might
include an account of such things. The diagram below illustrates the
idea.
So not knowing the
boundaries of nature, we have no business saying, “It is forbidden
to believe in X, because that is outside of the boundaries of
nature.”
Reason #2: A principle
of methodological naturalism conflicts with another older and more
widely advanced principle of scientific conduct, the principle of
self-correction.
An
advocate of the principle of methodological naturalism might try and
make it seem simple:
well, we scientists have this principle we're supposed to follow, and
so we have to follow it; simple as that. But
it's not so simple, because scientists have also advanced other
principles, and it turns out some of them conflict with the principle
of methodological naturalism. One such principle is sometimes called
the principle of self-correction, that science must always be willing
to revise its assumptions when the evidence warrants. But what if the
evidence should warrant the assumption that some supernatural cause
was at play? Then scientists would have to make a choice: either
follow the principle of self-correction demanding that assumptions be
revised when the evidence warrants it, and accept that evidence; or
follow a principle of methodological naturalism, and reject it.
Given such a conflict, we might ask: which principle is
more in sync with the spirit and essence of science? It is, of
course, the principle of self-correction, which has actually been
evoked by scientists far more often than the principle of
methodological naturalism.
Reason #3: Appeals to
the principle of methodological naturalism involve
question-begging, the fallacy of petitio principii.
Appealing to a principle of
methodological naturalism involves the fallacy of begging the
question, of assuming what is to be proven. The reason is as
follows: obviously it makes no sense to follow a principle of
methodological naturalism unless there are no supernatural effects–
for if there were supernatural effects, why would we not want science
to learn about them? The principle only seems to make sense if you
first assume there are no supernatural effects, and then conclude
that science should follow the principle of never admitting the
possibility of such effects. But whether or not there are
supernatural effects is typically the issue being debated at the time
such a principle is evoked, so you can't just start out with the
assumption that no such effects exist, because that's the matter
being debated. Here we have a fallacy which philosophers call
petitio principii, and which is more informally known as
begging the question. It's the fallacy of starting out by assuming
what you are trying to prove.
Reason #4: The
principle of methodological naturalism is supported by appeals to
“normative behavior,” but it is very dubious that such a norm
actually exists among a great majority of scientists; and even if it did
exist, majority support is not a good justification for a
principle.
The
person arguing for the principle of methodological naturalism
typically attempts to argue that it is some kind of rule of conduct
for scientists. But it is actually very dubious that such a rule is
rigidly followed or has been endorsed by a majority of scientists.
Because of all of the vast number of specialties in science, most
scientists never become involved with questions of whether we should
admit some supernatural effect as a possibility. We certainly do not
have a case in which a majority of scientists have signed on to some
principle that supernatural effects must never be considered as a
possibility. No written declaration of principles endorsed by a
majority of scientists supports such a principle of methodological
naturalism.
Even
if it were a case that most scientists had publicly endorsed such a
principle, the fact that the majority held such a principle would
not justify it. Opinions held by the majority are very often wrong,
and principles followed by the majority are very often wrong.
In
the case of the scientific community, we have a cultural subgroup or
subculture that may be subject to the sociological effects that
influence most subcultures: group taboos, “herd behavior,”
groupthink, and so forth. So the fact that some principle may be
followed by a majority of scientists does not establish the wisdom of
such a principle, and may merely tell us about customs or cultural
taboos of a sort that may be mainly cultural or sociological in
nature.
Any
attempt to establish a principle of methodological naturalism by
claiming that most scientists support it (or most scientists have
supported it) is reasoning that commits fallacies such as the “appeal
to authority” fallacy or the “appeal to tradition” fallacy.
Reason #5: In its most
rigid form, the principle of methodological naturalism is a “think
like a psychotic” principle with the same general form as
principles followed by those clinging to delusions.
In
its most rigid form the principle of methodological naturalism holds
that whenever we get evidence seeming to suggest the supernatural, we should
interpret it as evidence of the natural. Now such a principle has a
general form or schema or outline, which is like this:
Whenever
you receive evidence that seems to show X, interpret it as evidence
that shows non-X or the opposite of X.
There
is another group that follows this type of thinking. It is
psychotics. When a psychotic person has a delusion, he may interpret
all evidence that seems to show his delusion is false as being
evidence that is consistent with his delusion or evidence in support
of his delusion. For example, a psychotic may believe that he is the
king of the world, and may interpret all evidence seeming to
contradict that belief as evidence that is consistent with that
belief or a confirmation of it.
Not
wishing to think like psychotics, we should not follow any principle
that has the general form of: whenever you receive evidence that
seems to show X, interpret it as evidence that shows non-X or the
opposite of X. Since the principle of methodological naturalism is
such a principle, we should reject it.
Current
evocations of the principle of methodological naturalism are signs of
desperation. If no evidence for supernatural effects were
accumulating, no one would ever try to evoke such a biased rule,
which is so clearly in conflict with the more essential scientific rule of
“objectively follow the evidence wherever it leads.” Instead
scientists would just say, “We would believe in that if there were
any evidence for it; but there isn't any evidence for it.” But when
someone is besieged by an accumulation of evidence that he doesn't
want to accept, and can no longer plausibly claim that such evidence
does not exist, he may in desperation try to evoke some rule that
tries to disqualify such evidence by claiming it is a violation of
procedural rules.
No comments:
Post a Comment